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1. INTRODUCTION
The credit crisis was certainly not one of those “fore-
castable” events. If we ask why economists failed to pre-
dict the credit crisis, we should also ask why political sci-
entists failed to predict the recent Arab Spring, or a terror-
ist event like 9/11, or why seismologists cannot predict
earthquakes.
Raghuram Rajan
The American economy, the European Union and with it Capitalism in general,
have had serious troubles lately. Not, with luck, as serious, as in 1929, when a stock
market crash on Wall Street set off the global Great Depression, but serious,
nonetheless. In a longer perspective, 2001–2011 might come to be seen as the 10
years – when after two decades of mostly unbroken progress – capitalism gave way
to something more ambiguous and uncertain. U.S. corporate governance, capital-
ism American style has got a lot of criticism. But, after all, we believe, it is human
behavior that can be blamed for the troubles and not capitalism in general. In this
sense, the above cited words of Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan most properly
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In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global compet-
itiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic
impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the
main engine of world economic growth for quite some time to come, or at least
in the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest
open economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of
global economic stability as a valuable public good? Was the recent crisis pre-
dictable? These are the main questions addressed, all of which are answered in
a new global context, and the responses are based on some known principles
of international economics and economic history.
encapsulate the story of the recent evaporating of enormous amounts of wealth.
The decade of 2001–2011 were the first, perhaps since the start of America’s great
equity bull market in 1982, when the U.S. and the world became significantly less
wealthy.1
The capitalist system, the American economy and the international financial
markets in general, however, have proved surprisingly robust in the face of recent
crises, they have shown their muscles and also their willingness to adapt to change.
But, if they are to keep their strength, there should be some systemic changes and
indeed global efforts made.2 After the severe blows dealt to the trust and values of
American capitalism, one wonders whether the U.S. economy will preserve its
dominant world economic position, and whether it will stay an attractive place to
invest. In many countries, experience calls the American model into question in
any case. 
This paper will argue that the American economy could and will absorb the
recent shocks, and that in the longer run (within a matter of years), it will some-
how convert the revealed weaknesses to its advantage. America has a long record
of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular brand of cap-
italism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the robber barons in
the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 1929 crash.
The American economy has experienced market imperfections of all kinds but it
almost always has found, true, not perfect, but fairly reliable regulatory answers
and has managed to adapt to change, (lately e. g. the Dodd–Frank Act on financial
stability). The U.S. has many times pioneered in the elaboration of both theoretical
and policy oriented solutions for conflicts between markets and government to
increase economic welfare (Bernanke 2008: 425). There is no single reason why it
should not turn the latest financial calamities to its advantage. At the same time, to
regain confidence in capitalism as a global system, global efforts are indispensable.
To identify some of the global economic conflicts that have a lot to do with U.S.
markets in particular, we shall seek answers to the following questions.
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1 Total global marketable wealth, that is all assets traded in the financial markets, such as shares and
bonds, fell by almost 40% over the last ten years, according to a study by the Boston Consulting Group.
The number of households with at least $250,000 of marketable wealth dropped from 39 million to
37 million (see www://quote.Bloomberg.com/newsarchive). For a more detailed analysis of the
changing wealth positions of different countries and world economic regions as reported by World
Wealth Report, 1.6 trillion (1,600 billion) worth of financial assets evaporated only in the US markets
alone. In 2009, 7 trillion had been wiped off. (US Weekly Analyst, March 24, 2011.)
2 The most awful shock of 2001 was the terrorist attack on September 11. The financial system stood
up to it remarkably well. A lot of credit was due to the central banks and to the IMF itself, the pledge
made by Hörst Köhler, IMF chairman of the Board, right after the disaster “There is commitment to
ensuring that this tragedy will not be compounded by disruption to the global economy, …our cen-
tral banks will provide liquidity to ensure that financial markets operate in an orderly fashion” has
entirely been lived up to. Moreover, both the American economy and, more broadly, the world econ-
omy have rebounded much more strongly than anybody dared hope. Yet the attacks proved that even
where capitalism is well established, it is increasingly vulnerable to those who hate it. No amount of
success in the current war on terrorism will eliminate this hideous new risk, which is impossible to
quantify. Seven years later, John Lipsky remarked in his speech at John Hopkins University, Towards
a Post Crisis Economy, re-emphasized the same principle saying “these reforms can only be successful
if they rest on the principles of free markets”. www.imf.org/esternal/speeches/2008/111708.htm.
In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global compet-
itiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic
impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the
main engine of world economic growth for quite some time to come, or at least
in the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest
open economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of
global economic stability as a valuable public good? We offer affirmative answers
to these questions. 
1.1. MACROECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AS POINTS OF DEPARTURE
(A) The underlying framework of analysis in the paper relies on some standard
propositions of open macroeconomics (Krugmann–Obstfeld 2003: 344–377).
However, in our discussion we shall use these propositions as basic principles
that may be subject to varying interpretations as function of a changing envi-
ronment, domestic and global. We consider both individuals (consumers and
investors), firms and government as economic agents who are ready to learn
from past and recent experience, ones who are willing to change their behav-
ior as circumstances change. In this perspective, we believe in the “evolution”
of both economic principles, describing relevant economic behavior, and in
the adoptive learning capacity of economic agents. Thus, we do not subscribe
to the idea that fixed, atemporal laws are capable of precisely capturing and
forecasting future (or expected) patterns of economic behavior. 
(B) We hasten to add, nonetheless, that the indispensable virtues of model-based,
rigorous analysis in advancing economic theory are to be fully recognized by
the author. In addition, we acknowledge that the significance of the require-
ment for the appropriate quantification of the outcome of economic events,
and more importantly, the need to develop the capacity to forecast events,
with a reasonable margin of error, cannot be overestimated. But it may not be
overlooked that, to a large degree, the outcome of many fundamental eco-
nomic decisions, whether individual-, firm- or government-related are based
on people’s beliefs and expectations about the future. This is especially the
case on the global asset markets and on foreign exchange markets that move
tremendous amounts of money with a lot of lagged real effects. On these mar-
kets, people are playing against people (and central banks) that value assets
on the basis of their feelings about the future. In our age, flooded with infor-
mation, these feelings, at best, are largely unstable.3 Thus, trying to under-
stand human behavior – which, is always subject to change as circumstances
change, and incorporate that into economic analysis, is perhaps a genuine
and valuable effort. 
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3 This, of course, is not a new dilemma on asset (especially on stock) markets, but the IT revolution has
brought about new dimensions and twists to reckon with. This is being emphasized in new text-
books, e.g. Bernanke (2008).
(C) It is an important point of departure that the U.S. economy, against the rest of
the world, is still very large and the dollar continues to be the most important
currency in international financial markets. Therefore U.S. policies are marked-
ly more important – save the common policies of the euro-zone, EU-17, and EU-
27 – than any other country for the evolution of the world economy. Because
the U.S. economy has become more open, the foreign repercussions of U.S.
policies are significant today not only for their impact on other economies but
also for their influence at home. Because the other leading OECD economies
have become substantially larger, and the EU-27 especially has graduated to be
on a par in every sense of economic potential (output and resources in gener-
al), their policies effect the U.S. economy and the whole world economy more
strongly than any time earlier.
(D) Under these circumstances, the U.S. policy makers must pay more attention to
the international situation for national as well for global reasons. Furthermore,
the governments of the other major industrialized nations must be viewed as a
small group of economic actors whose decisions are truly interdependent and
important jointly for the world economy. Thus, sub-optimal policy choices are
likely to emerge in this sort of situation, and all countries can be hurt. In other
words, the situation calls for policy coordination and for international supervi-
sion.4 In this sense, global mistakes can be worse than national mistakes.
(E) Governments engage in frequent consultations, exchanging information about
national policies and comparing economic forecasts, and these routine activi-
ties can and do lead to better policies by reducing uncertainty domestically
and globally. In this sense, improving the global economic outlook can be con-
sidered as a public good that offers global benefits. This reasoning would fol-
low the analogy of the public good concept of the international financial sta-
bility, a concept fully recognized by now. In light of the recent global concerns,
both in terms of global growth patterns and in regard to increasing uncertain-
ty on international financial markets, this line of reasoning should get more
attention. Keeping these global concerns in mind, we shall review some of the
impacts that the U.S. economy has generated by its domestic economic events
and has channeled them through its global links to world markets. The paper
will be structured as follows.
First, as part of the introduction, we shall review the markedly changed world
economic environment and its outcomes on the U.S. roles in the international divi-
sion of labor. In section 1, we shall examine the changing international debt posi-
tion of the U.S. economy as global link-1. Then, in section 2, we shall discuss some
reborn concerns of the business cycles and the responses to it. In section 3 we shall
survey some recent developments of financial market regulation which were gen-
erated in the U.S. economy but have rapidly spread to global financial markets, too.
Section 4 provides a summary and a final conclusion.
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4 In principle, one should add, coordination can also have perverse effects, when it is conducted under
great uncertainty about future outlook, (Rajan, 2010) emphasized that first in the context of the
recent crisis.
1.2. A MARKEDLY DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Classical and neo-classical trade theories have established benchmark values in
economic thinking and they must have their respective chapters in all economics
textbooks.5 However, they are increasingly irrelevant to the analysis of businesses
in the countries currently at the core of the world economy: the United States,
Japan, the nations of Western Europe, and, to an increasing extent, the most suc-
cessful East Asian countries. Within this advanced and highly integrated “core”
world economy, context differences among corporations are becoming more
important than aggregate differences among countries.6 Furthermore, the increas-
ing capacity of even small companies to operate in a global perspective makes the
old analytical frameworks even more obsolete.
Not only are the “core nations” more homogeneous than before in terms of liv-
ing standards, lifestyles, and economic organization, but their factors of produc-
tion tend to move more rapidly in search of higher returns. Natural resources have
lost much of their previous role in national specialization Rodrik (2007), Bhagwati
(2004: 128–130), as advanced, knowledge-intensive societies move rapidly into the
age of artificial materials and genetic engineering (Nováky 1999). Capital moves
around the world in massive amounts at the speed of light, increasingly, corpora-
tions raise capital simultaneously in several major markets. Labor skills in these
advanced countries no longer can be considered fundamentally different; modern
and ongoing training has become a key dimension of many joint ventures between
international corporations. Technology and “know-how” are also rapidly becoming
a global pool. Trends in protection of intellectual property and export controls
clearly have less impact than the massive development of the means to communi-
cate, duplicate, store, and reproduce information.7
Against this background, the ability of corporations of all sizes to use these glob-
ally available factors of production is a far bigger factor in international competi-
tiveness than broad macroeconomic differences among countries. In effect, the
traditional world economy in which products are exported has been replaced by
one in which value is added in several different countries and the notion of nation-
al competitiveness has gone through a dramatic change Rodrik (2007), Bhagwati
(2004), Krugman (1994), Török (1999), Simai–Gál (2002), Csaba (2005).
At the moment, the United States has some peculiar but significant competitive
advantages. For one thing, individualism and entrepreneurship-characteristics that
are deeply ingrained in the American spirit- are increasingly a source of competi-
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5 The pioneering works of Prof. Mátyás have provided a solid guarantee to this early in the Hungarian
literature (Mátyás, 1973, 1992, 1996) and on issues of international and world economics the seminal
works of Tamás Szentes, (Szentes 1988, 2005) should be mentioned.
6 For countries of the semi-periphery with respect to current global trends, there are a lot of new devel-
opments to account for, and renewed distinctions to be made, for a recent work surveying these devel-
opments, see Rodrik (2007).
7 These new tendencies that give new opportunities to trade have been recognized and surveyed for
large, as well as for small countries, early on, Bognár (1976), Kádár (1979), Csaba (1984), and Simai
(1994), Csaba (1994, 2005, 2009), Szentes (1996, 2005), Török (1999), Kozma (2002), in the Hunga-
rian literature, too. 
tive advantage, as the creation of value becomes more knowledge-intensive. When
inventiveness and entrepreneurship are combined with abundant risk capital,
superior R&D efforts and budgets, and with an inflow of foreign brainpower, it is
not surprising that since the mid-1980s, U.S. companies – from Boston to Austin,
Silicon Alley to Silicon Valley – dominate world markets in software, biotechnolo-
gy, internet-related business, microprocessors, aerospace, and entertainment.8
Also, U.S. firms are moving rapidly forward to construct an information superhigh-
way and related multimedia technology, where as their European and Japanese
rivals face continued regulatory and bureaucratic roadblocks. The American econ-
omy provides ample opportunities to profitable investments. Little wonder that
throughout the last two decades the U.S. economy has been receiving continuous
and large doses of foreign (investment) capital. Foreigners like to invest in the U.S.
But there are some other, maybe, less obvious reasons that explain why the
American investors’ money. Of course, the excellent opportunities, the big attrac-
tion of returns far exceeding normal profits have, at times, may lead to excesses, to
misuse of funds, as well to outright frauds. We have been hearing lately more of the
latter in connection with the revealed questionable ethics of some large firms of
the élite corporate America. Yet, we shall argue that the strength and the attractive-
ness of U.S. markets will, very likely, remain (even with the largely uncertain glob-
al outcomes of the ongoing war against Afghanistan). 
The two prime transmitters of competitive forces in the global economy are the
multinational corporations and the international capital markets. What differenti-
ates the multinational enterprise from other firms engaged in international busi-
ness is the globally coordinated allocation of resources by a single centralized man-
agement. Multinational corporations make decisions about market-entry strategy;
ownership of foreign operations; and production, marketing, and financial activi-
ties with an eye to what is best for the corporation as a whole. The true multina-
tional corporation emphasizes group performance rather than the simple aggre-
gated performance of its individual parts. In this sense, the multinational compa-
nies can set standards globally for the efficiency targets of the leading firms in the
industry. The growing irrelevance of borders for corporations will, at the same
time, force policymakers to rethink old approaches to regulation. For example, cor-
porate mergers that once would have been barred as anti-competitive might make
sense if the true measure of a company’s market share is global rather than nation-
al. In general, the multinational firm is efficient and mostly successful in allocating
resources with well defined global goals. One cannot argue that national
economies and their governments can claim to have such goals. On the contrary,
their coordination and resource allocation efforts are serving purely domestic
needs. 
In the Hungarian literature it has been also known and extensively analyzed for
quite some time (Kádár [1979], Inotai [1989], Lőrincné Istvánffy–Lantos [1993],
Palánkai [1996]), that global economic forces and international economic integra-
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8 For empirical evidence explaining the early breakthrough of U.S. High-tech industries in an imperfect
competition framework by some new factors of competitiveness, see Magas (1992) and Magas
(2002b).
tion also reduce the freedom of governments and central banks to determine their
own economic policy. At the same time, globalization and integration do enlarge
the room for companies to foreign investments and multinational operations in
general. Yet, the desire for making national economic policy choices does remain.
If a government tries to raise tax rates on business, for example, it is increasingly
easy for business to shift production abroad. Similarly, nations that fail to invest in
their physical and intellectual infrastructure (roads, bridges, R&D, education) will
likely lose entrepreneurs and jobs to nations that do invest. Capital – both financial
and intellectual – will go where it is wanted and stay where it is well treated. In
short, economic integration and the free flow of capital are forcing governments,
as well as companies, to compete. Through sending the right price signals interna-
tional financial markets are becoming good, yet not perfect, mediators to investors
worldwide to vote with their moneys – and let them invest in economies and com-
panies that perform best globally.
As markets become more efficient, they are quicker to reward sound economic
policy-and swifter to punish the profligate. Their judgments are harsh and cannot
easily be appealed. True, as markets become more global and there is enhanced
mobility of the factors of production, knowledge and information, unseen types of
market imperfections emerge, and with that new dilemmas are created for regula-
tors, both domestic and international. The global financial markets for instance
have been especially innovative in creating new complexities and risks that were
tough matches to both under-informed investors and regulators, domestic and
international alike. The American securities markets, along with the tightly knit
international capital markets have produced a good deal of crises in the last two
decades. In 2008–2009 they led to globally dire consequences – to a global reces-
sion. That it has happened, both the “self-regulatory” mechanisms of markets and
the yet mostly uncoordinated actions of financial-market regulators can be credit-
ed. For good market performance –among other things– we need efficient mar-
kets, good rules, and, of course, determined; yet not over-ambitious regulators that
have a powerful bite, nonetheless. Between crisis and resolution, however, is
always uncharted territory, with the ever-present potential of panic feeding on
itself and spreading from one nation to another, leading to global instability and
recession. What we can say about markets, however, is that they are, to a large
extent, self-correcting; unlike many governments, when investors spot problems,
their instinct is to withdraw funds, not add more. At the same time, if a nation’s
economic fundamentals are basically sound, investors will eventually recognize
that and their capital will return. As a general rule, however governments and reg-
ulators learn, too. True, they learn slowly, but they do learn. At least, that is the
impression one gets from the American experience of interactions between mar-
kets and government of the last two decades. Overall, the strength of the American
economy in building wealth, individual and corporate, the resilience of its finan-
cial system and the attractiveness of its domestic markets, at least in the eye of for-
eign investors can be accredited, in no small measure to the not flawless but flexi-
ble and mostly proper economic policy actions taken. One must add, that the sat-
isfactory interactions between markets and government in the last twenty years or
so, can be, perhaps to a large extent, credited to the quality of the American grad-
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uate economics education.9 This strength was reflected in measurable terms: the
strong, one could say markedly superior performance of the U.S. markets stands
out for the 1970–2011 period, when measured by GDP and employment growth
terms and compared to the European region, now known as the EU-27 (EU 15 ear-
lier), as was reported by the World Economic Report (WER 2011). 
The future global growth patterns, however will be determined more by the
strength of the demand factors of the emerging markets, and that shift will be
reflected in the expected patterns of the advanced economies, too (see Figure 1
below).
Source: IMF (2010)
Figure 1. Global GDP growth, percentage, quarter over quarter, annualized
2. DEBT HISTORY AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE USA10
The U.S. economy is still by far the largest capital importer of the world economy.
This was tru even in the bad year of 2001, which was overshadowed by the
September 11 terrorist attack, when foreign direct investment (FDI), fell by 51% to
around USD 735 billion (the biggest decline for over 30 years).11 It remained the
largest importer of foreign funds, after 2008–2010 crisis and despite the sudden
waning of the cross-border merger frenzy, America still remained the largest recip-
ient of FDI with inflows of USD 124 billion. The reasons why the United States
prides itself as the number one importer of foreign capital are not self evident. In
this section, we shall elaborate at some length on the meaning of international
wealth.
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9 This assumption is rarely made in economic analysis, yet we think it is important.
10 In this section, I extend and refine the analysis that I have given in Magas (2002b, pp.159–178).
11 According to the World Investment Report, quoted by The Economist, “The World this week”, 14--20
September 2002. WER (2011) confirms the existence of this pattern. World Bank (2011).
The United States ran trade deficits from early Colonial times to just before
World War I, as Europeans sent investment capital to develop the continent.
During its 300 years as a debtor nation – a net importer of capital – the United
States progressed from the status of a minor colony to the world’s strongest power.
In 1987, the United States became a net international debtor, reverting to the posi-
tion it was in at the start of the 20th century. By the end of 2010, U.S. net interna-
tional wealth was –$2.8 trillion. Does this huge amount of negative international
wealth mean that overall the U.S. is using its world economic relations to attract
funds to build its domestic wealth? To some extent, yes. But a large part of it goes
to current consumption and some of it disappears due to exchange rate fluctua-
tions. A large part is explained by U.S. government borrowing.
The US government was heavily borrowing from the rest of the world over the
last two centuries as it is depicted by figure 2. 
Source: usgovernmentspending.com
Figure 2. Gross Public Debt of the U.S. in percentage of GDP (1792–2010)
How can a long term indebtedness be maintained for a large open economy?
We begin the argument by a basic theoretical proposition:
An economy cannot have excess demands in all its markets. If there are excess
in demands in some markets, there must be excess supplies to other markets. In an
economy with markets for goods, market for securities and market for money this
general equilibrium proposition asserts that
Excess demand for goods + excess demand for securities + excess demand for
money = 0
This identity can be rewritten as:
Excess demand for goods + excess demand for securities = excess supply of
money
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In an open economy, this can be identified as the monetary approach to the bal-
ance of payments, which can be traced back to David Hume, who argued that that
surpluses and deficits are self-correcting, because of their effects of the money sup-
ply. The modern version is an application of the Walras’s law, which says that
excess demands and supply must sum to zero. Applied to an open economy, it says
that a country with a balance of payment deficit can be regarded as having excess
demands in goods and bond markets taken together, and must have excess supply
in its money market. It “exports” its excess supply of money to satisfy its excess
demand for goods and bonds.12 The monetary models of the balance of payments
have been used to explain the behavior of flexible exchange rates. The monetary
logic is still very appealing but empirical tests though have not been able to sup-
port it adequately to this day (Fisher 2001),13 (Bernanke, 2008).
Our main question in this regard is whether Japan and Europe, the main
sources of foreign funds flowing to the U.S. will and/or should stay as high-savers
and net international investors into the U.S., or rather, this cast among the leading
industrial powers is expected to change in the foreseeable future. It will be argued
that the for a more even future growth prospect for the world economy, the pre-
sent international division of lenders and borrowers is largely unbalanced and thus
is likely to change. To provide some support to this statement we shall rely on a
standard open economy framework.
The standard open-macroeconomic framework, (Krugman–Obstfeld, 2000,
2003, pp. 344–377), applies a set of accounting identities that link domestic spend-
ing, savings, and consumption and investment behavior to the capital account and
current account balances. By these national accounting identities, one can identi-
fy the nature of the links between the U.S. and world economies. This will follow
next.
Let U.S. start with the observation that U.S. national income (or national prod-
uct) Y is either spent on consumption C, or is saved, S.
YI = C + S (1)
Similarly, national expenditure (the total amount that the U.S. economy spends
on goods and services, can be divided into spending on consumption and on
investment. This relationship provides the second identity:
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12 For a detailed discussion of the merits and of the limits of the monetary approach, see Kenen (1988,
pp. 353–371) and Száz (1991, pp. 48–84), Szentes (1999, pp. 281–426), Magas (2002b, pp.139–148).
13 Monetary models of the balance of payments use very strict assumptions which are hard to meet in
the real world. These are: (1) There are no rigidities in the factor markets. (2)There is perfect capi-
tal mobility, so domestic interest rates are tied strongly to foreign rates. (3) Domestic and foreign
prices are held together by purchasing power parity, PPP, so the domestic price level is fixed when
the exchange rate is pegged. The PPP plays a central role, and there are strong reasons for doubting
its validity. The PPP doctrine cannot be derived from the law of one price, which holds only across
markets for a single good. It can be derived from the supposition that money is neutral, but this
means that it applies to the long run and only with regard to monetary shocks. PPP should not be
used to predict actual exchange rate behaviour, even as crude rule of thumb.
Ys = C + I (2)
Subtracting (2) from (1), that is National income–National spending, yields a
new identity:
YI –Ys = S – I (3)
If the U.S. economy spends more than it produces, it will invest domestically
more than it saves and have a net capital inflow. The U.S. has long been known a
low saver and a high capital-importing country. This is the case until today (Fig 3).
Beginning again with national product, let us subtract from it spending on
domestic goods and services. The remaining goods and services must equal
exports. Similarly, if we subtract spending on domestic goods and services from
total expenditures, the remaining spending must be on imports. Combining these
two identities leads to another national income identity:
National income–National spending = Exports–Imports
YI –Ys = X – M (4)
Figure 3 illustrates the lasting borrowing needs of the United States for the
1991–2011 period. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, CNBC
Figure 3 U.S Debt and annual Deficit (Billion USD) 1991–2011
Equation (4) says that a current account surplus arises when national output
exceeds domestic expenditures; similarly, a current account deficit due to domes-
tic expenditures exceeding domestic output. Moreover, when Equation (4) is com-
bined with Equation (3), we have a new identity:
Savings–Investment = Exports–Imports
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S – I = X–M (5)
According to Equation (5), if a nation’s savings exceed its domestic investment,
that nation will run a current account surplus.14 A nation such as the United States,
which saves less than it invests, must run a current account deficit. Noting that sav-
ings minus domestic investment equals net foreign investment, we have the follow-
ing identity:
Net foreign investment (NFI) = Exports–Imports 
NFI = X–M (6)
Equation (6) says that the balance on the current account must equal the net
capital outflow.
These accounting identities also suggest that a current account surplus is not
necessarily a sign of economic vigor, nor is a current account deficit necessarily a
sign of weakness or a lack of competitiveness. But there are some important points
to be considered in this context. Indeed, economically healthy nations that provide
good investment opportunities tend to run trade deficits because this is the only
way to run a capital account surplus. The U.S. ran surpluses while the infamous
Smoot–Hawley tariff helped sink the world into depression. In addition, nations
that grow rapidly will import more goods and services; at the same time those
weak economies will slow down or reduce their imports because imports are pos-
itively related to income (in the short run import propensities do not change). As
a result, the faster a nation grows relative to the other economies, the larger its cur-
rent account deficit (or smaller its surplus). Conversely, slower-growing nations
will have smaller current account deficits (or larger surpluses). Hence, current
account deficits may reflect strong economic growth or a low level of savings, and
current account surpluses can signify a high level of savings or a slow rate of
growth. Because current account deficits are financed by capital inflows, the
cumulative effect of these deficits is to increase net foreign claims against the
deficit nation and reduce that nation’s net international wealth. Similarly, nations
that consistently run current account surpluses increase their net international
wealth, where net international wealth is just the difference between a nation’s
investment abroad and a foreign investment domestically. Sooner or later, deficit
countries like the United States become net international debtors, and surplus
countries like Japan or Germany and the entire euro area become net creditors.
National spending can be divided into household spending plus private invest-
ment plus government spending. Household spending, in turn, equals national
income less the sum of private savings and taxes. Combining these terms yields the
following identity.
Ys = C+I+G = 
Ys =Yi–S–T+I+G (7)
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14 This equation explains the Japanese current account surplus: the Japanese have an extremely high
savings rate, both in absolute terms and relative to their investment rate.
Rearranging Equation (7) yields a new expression for excess national spending,
after rearranging
Ys – Yi = I–S+G–T (8)
Where the government budget deficit equals government spending minus
taxes. Equation (8) says that excess national spending is composed of two parts;
the excess of private domestic investment over private savings and the total gov-
ernment (federal, state, and local deficit). Because national spending minus nation-
al product equals the net capital inflow, Equation (8) also says that the nation’s
excess spending equals its net borrowing from abroad.
Rearranging and combining Equations (4) and (8) provides the last important
national accounting identity:
Current account balance CA = Private savings surplus + Government budget
deficit
CA = (S–I)+(T–G) (9)
Equation (9) reveals that the nation’s current account balance is identically
equal to its private savings minus investment balance and the government budget
deficit. According to this expression, a nation running a current account deficit is
not saving enough to finance its private investment and government budget
deficit. Conversely, a nation running a current account surplus is saving more than
is needed to finance its private investment and government deficit. The important
implication is that steps taken to correct the current account deficit can be effec-
tive only if they also change private savings, private investment, and/or the govern-
ment deficit. Policies or events that fail to affect both sides of the relationship
shown in equation (9) will not alter the current account deficit.
In the current world economic environment, in which growth in the developed
countries has been sluggish and in some countries seriously depressed, there is a
valid concern, though, on the merits of incessant and massive capital importing
and current account deficits. The large world economic imbalance of current
accounts should be a matter of concern even for a country as large and attractive a
place to invest as the United States, whose national legal tender happens to be the
leading reserve currency for the world economy. With the wild fluctuations of cur-
rency values and the largely unpredictable nature of foreign exchange rates and
with the emergence of more and more derivative products spreading risks among
many international participants, (banks, investment banks, brokerage houses
insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) there is a point where “internationally
composed” risks cannot be properly “decomposed”, measured and managed either
by holders of these products, or by the financial regulators.15 Thus the idea of
building (and buying assets) wealth internationally becomes somewhat blurred. 
True, the trust of foreign investors in the U.S. economy has been largely unbro-
ken even after repeated years of dismal stock market performance and the calami-
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ties of September 11. and the 2009 recession. But there is lot of discussion about
international payments imbalances and unsustainable patterns of world economic
growth, due to the actual current account deficit profile of the developed coun-
tries. Kenneth Rogoff, former chief economist of the IMF, voiced this concern.16
He argued that the constellation of global current account imbalances – with the
U.S. in deficit and Europe and Japan in surplus, – was clearly unsustainable in the
log run. The inevitable adjustment in the current account imbalances and
exchange rates will be much more severe when it ultimately comes. We hasten to
emphasize the significance of this decade long – argument to our analysis.
Considering that a net current account deficit represents inter-temporal trade,
with the deficit nation importing more goods and services for current use and
promising to repay net exports of goods and services in the future, one question
must be answered. For how long can this traditional cast of the U.S. economy being
a debtor, Japan and Europe being the creditor last? It can be reasoned that for a
more even and sustainable growth-pattern the world economy could surely bene-
fit from a higher U.S. savings rate and from a higher Japanese and euro area con-
sumption. The best thing for the global economy would be for Europe and Japan
to achieve a sustained increase in growth allowing private savings in the U.S. to rise
to more normal levels without a cutback in global demand. Coordinated action in
this regard would surely help global growth. National goals should be also adjust-
ed to some commonly agreed on global growth needs.
Nonetheless, for the IMF, and for Rogoff, when compared to Europe and Japan,
the U.S market mechanisms can be looked at as still markedly positive examples.
They believe that as long as continental Europe fails to accelerate labor market
reform and Japan hesitates in decisively ending deflation and addressing the need
for restructuring in its banking sector, the world is going to continue to look to the
U.S. as the main engine of growth.
In an extensive study (World Economic Outlook 2010), the IMF has document-
ed the increase in business cycle correlation across the largest countries of OECD
is roughly 55 per cent. This is significantly less than the correlation of business
cycles across the states within the U.S. So there is a lot of room for the closing up
of growth cycles and for macro policy coordination, with further integration of
OECD markets.
Viewing Europe from the outside, “reforms to facilitate EMU members ability
to adjust to shocks and cope with secular change has been rather slow.
Employment rates remain far below those in the US. This is by far the strongest
reason why per capita income is much higher in the U.S. than in Europe. High tax
burdens, generous unemployment benefits, high minimum wages and huge costs
of layoffs are among the reasons why employment is relatively low in Europe.”
(WSJ 2009, October 18–20, R8.)
This line of the Rogoff logic that contrasts European and American labor mar-
ket efficiency is spelled out with respect to the different growth prospects of the
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dilemma is almost unchanged, and has firmly reappeared in the 2008–2011 crisis years. 
two regions and has been firmly argued earlier by Solow (2000), too. The current
European system of adjustment mechanisms is just too rigid and insufficiently
adept at dealing with the environment of constant change we see in the current
world economic environment. Without a clear plan for medium term budget con-
solidation in some of the largest countries of EMU, growth prospects remain mod-
est. Growth will only come if Europe successfully confronts its broader structural
problems. These are very strong confirmations from two top-notch economists to
help us believe that the bulk of future global growth is not going to come but main-
ly from the future wealth – and especially the large banks – in the high-saver coun-
tries of the world economy.
But beside the large international payments imbalances between high- and low-
saver countries, there are some other new global concerns departing from the U.S.
economy, namely the rebirth of the business cycle concerns. We shall discuss that
next.
2.1. CAN WE READ BUSINESS CYCLES? 
If in the coming years we shall always be looking for consumption to pick up in the
U.S. and for financing from elsewhere, we may have a global business cycle prob-
lem at our hands. Cyclical patterns and their smoothing by government action are
a reborn concern in the American economy itself.17 It appears, though, as if the
views about governments’ ability to tame the business cycle have themselves
moved in cycles. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was widely believed that Keynesian
demand-management policies could stabilise economies: a properly measured
increase or decrease in government spending was all that was needed to reach the
desired level of output. But the stagflation of the 1970s produced a new economic
consensus that governments were powerless to do anything except restrain infla-
tion. By the 1990s the business cycle returned.18 The American mainstream eco-
nomic opinion has reflected this and had traditionally had the anti-cyclical stance
of government spending So, there is some evidence of learning from past experi-
ence.
The current dilemma is that three strongest economic regions of the global
economy are growing at distinctly different rates and all are looking for increasing
foreign demand. America’s mild recession in the years 2001 followed its longest
unbroken expansion in history. The euro area, until 2008 was in its ninth year of
growth, it has escaped outright recession, but has seen a sharp slowdown. In con-
trast, Japan’s economy has suffered three recessions since its own bubble burst at
the beginning of the 1990s. In Europe, inflation is not the problem but unemploy-
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1980s (Erdős (1976), Magas (1987), Magas (2009)).
18 The U.S. economy had three recessions between 1974 and 1982. However, since then, it has enjoyed
two long booms, in the 1980s and again in the 1990s, interrupted only briefly by a mild downturn,
leading many to believe that recessions were a thing of the past. For more on this issue see The
Economist, January 4 2003. and Magas (2009)
ment is. France has made it clear that it wants the Growth and Stability Pact rede-
fined, so it can have a more expansionary fiscal policy. Professor Stiglitz, for
instance, thinks that Europe has adopted a policy, which is pro-cyclical, which flies
in the face of what it should be doing. It should be anti-cyclical (do not cut your
government spending in a recession).19 Japan is indeed a great concern, too, with
respect to global growth prospects. Japan needs a determined effort to clean up its
banking sector, encourage needed corporate restructuring, and rein in ballooning
fiscal deficits over the medium term. It should act decisively to end deflation. So
far, Japan has tried a gradualist, “muddling through” approach. Far more ambitious
and sweeping reforms are needed. To some extent Japan is wrestling with the cri-
sis of the Japanese corporate model of a kind. The traditional sources of growth, as
accounted for by Móczár (1987a, 1987b), have not been fully exhausted, they are
just being suppressed by a deep and unusually stubborn deflationary cycle.
Source: OECD (2010)
Figure 4. Business cycle in the OECD countries 1990–2010
In relation to the steep economic downturn in the U.S. and in world markets in
general, one question is often asked: Do Central bankers monitor inflation and
cycle-related wealth effects together? Based on Figures 4 and 5, it is hard to believe.
One cannot see consumer confidence and real GDP go hand in hand.
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19 He argued that “Europe thought it could weather the storm on its own, but they have had their hands
tied by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact that codified the euro areas’ fiscal rules. Unlike in the U.S. they
have a monetary authority that is not supposed to look at employment and growth. The Stability and
Growth Pact is somewhat similar to the balanced budget amendment, which the U.S. rejected on the
grounds that it would be disastrous to have your hands tied in a way that makes you unable to respond
to a downturn.” (WSJ, October 18-20, R8). But the stability and growth pact in Europe is to be taken seri-
ously. The European Commission issued warnings to those big EU member states, Germany, France and
Italy for their excessive budget deficits. The harshest criticism was aimed at Germany, which is likely to
breach the pact's ceiling for deficits of 3% of GDP both in 2002 and 2003. This implies that strong,
nationally determined choices do remain. For a detailed analysis of this conflict, see the article “Breaking
the Pact” (The Economist, January 4 2003). The current, 2011 November situation is alarmingly similar
where what was at stake was the break up of the Euro zone (see more on this WSJ November 13 2011). 
Source: OECD (2010)
Figure 5. Business cycle in the US Economy 1990–2010
In the U.S., the Fed does take asset prices into account in its policymaking, but
only in so far as changes in them are transmitted to demand in the economy and
thus potentially affect the rate of inflation. The likely transmission mechanism is
the “wealth effect”. As share prices rise, people feel better off and spend more; as
they fall, people feel poorer and spend less, reducing inflationary pressure. In prac-
tice, the FED has seemed to act on the wealth effect only after share prices have fall-
en. For instance, when prices tumbled after the collapse of LTCM, (The Long Term
Capital Management Hedge Fund), the Fed cut interest rates sharply, and shares
started to recover at once. Given that a central bank could never be 100% sure at
the time that there is a bubble, would it be justified in trying to burst it if it were
80% sure, or 40%? This is a difficult question, and not just because raising interest
rates would be unpopular; if it were raising rates to control inflation, it would will-
ingly bear that burden for the sake of the economy. Keeping inflation under con-
trol does not challenge people’s judgments; by maintaining the real value of the
currency, it actually helps them to be confident that a price means what it appears
to. By contrast, asset prices reflect the free judgments about value made by millions
of people who have backed those judgments with their own money. Over the past
decade investors, firms and consumers worldwide put far too much faith in the
power of information technology, globalisation, financial liberalisation and mone-
tary policy to reduce volatility and risk. It did not pay off. ICT, information commu-
nication technology, the very sector that was supposed to smooth out the business
cycle through better inventory control, has ended up intensifying the current
downturn. 
In principle, globalisation can help to stabilise economies if they are at differ-
ent stages of the cycle, as was suggested by Obstfeld (1998), Pugel–Lindert (2002,
pp. 552–554), but the very forces of global integration are likely to synchronise
economic cycles more closely, so that downturns in different countries are more
likely to reinforce one another. Financial liberalisation is supposed to help house-
holds to borrow in bad times and so smooth out consumption, but again it has
trade-offs: it also makes it easier for firms and households to take on too much debt
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during booms, which may exacerbate subsequent downturns. This is what hap-
pened in the first half of the 1990s in Japan20.
In the United States, Alan Greenspan was widely considered a highly successful
chairman of the Federal Reserve, but the belief that he had special powers to elim-
inate the cycle is probably naive. In July 2001, Mr. Greenspan himself said in testi-
mony to Congress: 
“Can fiscal and monetary policy acting at their optimum eliminate the busi-
ness cycle? The answer, in my judgement, is no, because there is no tool to change
human nature. Too often people are prone to recurring bouts of optimism and pes-
simism that manifest themselves from time to time in the build-up or cessation of
speculative excesses.” 
Indeed, speculative excesses in asset prices and credit flows might occur more
frequently in the future, thanks to the combined effects of financial liberalisation
and a monetary-policy framework that concentrates on inflation but places no
direct constraint on credit growth and wealth effects. 
“It’s only when the tide goes out that you can see who’s swimming naked.”21 A
witty and realistic description of what was happening in the American economy
lately. The stock market boom in the late 1990s masked excessive borrowing by
firms and households, “irrational exuberance”, – the expression of Alan Greenspan
– and infectious greed is being shockingly exposed. Share prices have suffered
their steepest slide since the 1930s. Yet, this was not a normal business cycle, but
the end of the biggest stock market boom in America’s history. Never before have
shares become so overvalued. Between 1997–2001 share prices of the S&P 500
index reflected 30–50% more reported profits than the national accounts profits
registered at year end by official GDP statistics.22 Never before have so many peo-
ple owned shares. And never before has every part of the economy invested
(indeed, over-invested) in a new technology. 
In short, it appears that the business cycle is still alive, but it does appear to have
become more subdued. During the past 20 years, the American economy has been
in recession less than 10% of the time. In the 90 years before the Second World War,
it was in recession 40% of the time. In most other economies, too, expansions have
got longer and recessions shorter and shallower. The exception is Japan, which in
the past decade has suffered the deepest slump in any rich economy since the
1930s.
The revolt against Keynesian policies since the 1970s was based on the belief
that government intervention is inefficient and it may destabilise the economy.
However, America’s recent experience has shown that the private sector is quite
capable of destabilising things without government help. The most recent bubble
was not confined to the stock market: instead, the whole economy became distort-
ed. Firms over-borrowed and over-invested on unrealistic expectations about
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half of the 1990s, see Magas (2002 pp. 403–410).
21 This sarcastic remark can be often heard in the American financial community. The phrase is said to
have been used first by Warren Buffett, one of Wall Street's best-known investors.
22 Source: Dresdner-Wasserstein; Thomson Datastream 2002 (Nov. 11).
future profits and the belief that the business cycle was dead. Consumers ran up
huge debts and saved too little, believing that an ever rising stock market would
boost their wealth. The boom became self-reinforcing as rising profit expectations
pushed up share prices, which increased investment and consumer spending.
Higher investment and the then still strong dollar helped to hold down inflation
and hence interest rates, fuelling faster growth and higher share prices. That virtu-
ous circle has turned vicious and did tremendous damage: since March 2007 until
December of 2009, the Dow Jones Industrials Stock Index has fallen by more than
49%, some $7 trillion has been wiped off the value of American shares, equivalent
to two-thirds of annual GDP!23 In addition, global growth is still very cyclical.
Source: Bloomberg.com 
Figure 6. Performance of DOW Jones Stock index 2007–2011
If labor productivity remains strong, it should help firms to restore profits as
well as ensure robust long-term growth. The slide in the stock market, then, may
only reflect a crisis of confidence in corporate governance and accounting fraud,
not deep-seated economic problems. It is true that until 2010 America has benefit-
ed from faster productivity growth since the mid-1990s (although the rise is less
than once thought).24 But, as with all previous technological revolutions, from rail-
ways to electricity to cars, excess capacity and increased competition, in the long
run, are ensuring that most of the benefits of higher productivity go to consumers
and workers, in the shape of lower prices and higher real wages, rather than into
profits. This is the highly desired outcome of any well-performing capitalism.
Equity returns are therefore likely to be a lot lower over the next decade than the
preceding one. As a result, households will need to save much more towards their
pensions, which – other factors being unchanged – will drag down growth some-
what. But even then, it is very likely, for the U.S. economy to recover and gather sus-
tainable momentum with the recent fiscal and monetary stimulus, there is no other
safe way out for long term growth but increasing domestic savings and rely less on
foreign funds. 
79ISTVÁN MAGAS: POST-CRISIS LESSONS
23 As reported by Goldman Sachs, U.S. Weekly Analyst, March 24, 2011, quoted by Thomson Datastream.
24 The first two waves of the computer age starting in the early 1980s for some very special reasons -
and to a large extent paradoxically - did not bring the long expected productivity gains for the
American economy. For a detailed discussion of the probable causes of lagging productivity growth
in the first half of the 1990s, see Magas (2002 pp. 392–403).
To sum it all up, we conclude that after decades of declining economic volatili-
ty in developed economies, the business cycle may become more volatile again
over the coming years mainly as a function of the changing fortunes of asset mar-
kets and with it the volatile wealth position of American savers and consumers. In
addition, the IT revolution and globalization apparently have not deleted the busi-
ness cycle.
2.2. KEY CURRENCY RATES DEFY THEORIES
It is still a major global concern about floating exchange rates of key currencies
that they can be highly variable. Some variability presumably is not controversial,
including exchange rate movements that offset inflation rate differentials and
exchange rate movements that promote an orderly adjustment to shocks, Erdős
(1998, pp. 299–305), Darvas–Szapáry (1999), Pugel–Lindert (2002, pp. 402–404)
(Bernanke 2008, pp. 446–448). However, the substantial variability of exchange
rates within fairly short time periods like months or a few years is more controver-
sial. What are the possible effects of exchange rate variability that might concern
us? If the variability simply creates unexpected gains and losses for short-term
financial investors who deliberately take positions exposed to exchange rate risk,
we probably would not be much concerned. However, we would be concerned if
heightened exchange rate risk discourages such international activities as trade in
goods and services or foreign direct investment. Exchange rate variability then
would have real effects, by altering activities in the part of the economy that pro-
duces goods and services.
Overshooting raises another concern about real effects of the variability of float-
ing exchange rates. When exchange rates overshoot, they send signals about changes
in international price competitiveness. Big swings in price competitiveness create
incentives for large shifts in real sources. For example, if overshooting leads to a
large appreciation of the country’s currency, this creates the incentive for labor to
move out of export-orientated and import-competing industries, as the country loses
a large amount of price-competitiveness. New capital investment in these industries
is strongly discouraged, and some existing facilities are shut down. However, as the
overshooting then reverses itself, these resource movements appear to have been
excessive. Resources then must move back into these industries.
Relative price adjustments are an important and necessary part of the market
system. They signal the need for resource reallocations. The concern here is not
with relative price changes in general. The concern is with the possibility that the
dynamics of floating exchange rates sometimes send false price signals or signals
that are too strong, resulting in excessive resource reallocations. Proponents and
defenders of floating rates agree that variability has been high and that some real
effects occur. Exchange rates are price signals about the relative values of curren-
cies. These signals represent the summary of information about the currencies at
that time. As economic and political conditions change the price signals change
too. The variability of exchange rates represents the ongoing market-based quest
for economic efficiency. The proponents of floating rates believe that the support-
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ers of fixed rates delude themselves by claiming that the lack of variability of fixed
rates is a virtue. A fixed exchange rate can be looked at as form of price control.
Price controls are generally inefficient because they either too high or too low.
That is with a fixed rate the country’s currency is often overvalued or undervalued
by government fiat. Sudden changes can be highly disruptive, and it often occurs
in a crisis atmosphere brought on by large capital flows, as speculators believe that
they have a one-way speculative gamble on the direction of the exchange rate.
In sum, as a general statement on the exchange rate debate it can be said that
variability and overshooting may have logic in international finance, but they
nonetheless cause undesirable real effects like discouragement of international
trade and excessive resource shifts.25 Exchange rates should make transactions
between countries as smooth and easy as possible. To the opponents of floating
rates, exchange rates, like money, serve transaction functions best when their val-
ues are stable.
Each of the major international capital market related currency crises since
1994 in Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil,
Argentina and Turkey in 2000, has in some way involved fixed or pegged exchange
rate regimes. At the same time, countries that did not have pegged rates – among
them South Africa, Israel, Turkey, and Mexico in 1998 – avoided crises of the type
that affected emerging market countries with pegged rates. Little wonders, then,
that policymakers involved in dealing with these crises warned strongly against the
types of pegged rates for countries open to international capital flows. That warn-
ing has tended to take the form of advice that intermediate policy regimes between
hard pegs and floating are not sustainable 
But this bipolar view has not solidified either. Fisher (2001) argued that propo-
nents of this bipolar view – himself included– have exaggerated their point for a
dramatic effect. The right statement with respect to desirability of flexible
exchange rate regimes is that “for countries open to international capital flows (i)
pegs are not sustainable unless they are very hard indeed; but (ii) a wide variety
of exchange rates are possible; and (iii) it is to be expected that policy in most
countries will not be indifferent to exchange rate movements” (Fisher, 2001, p. 2).
For Hungary, as well as for other emerging markets, this statement has strongly
proven itself (Darvas–Szapáry 1999, Magas 2000).
On the way to developing a fundamental, let alone “fool proof” theory on the
determination of exchange rates serious doubts remain. In an IMF working paper,
Brooks et al (2001) have found, for instance, that the key feature of currency mar-
kets over the 2000–2001 has been the pronounced weakness of the euro particu-
larly against the U.S. dollar. The theoretically important feature of their argument
is that the weakness seemed to have defied “traditional” explanations of exchange
rate determination, which focus on interest rate differentials and current account
imbalances. For instance, in the mentioned years the interest rate differentials
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evaluation of the impacts of real exchange rate changes in particular. Empirical results point to many
different directions, which are hard to encapsulate into a single new theory. For a review, see: Froot
–Rogoff (1995) and Edison–Melick (1999), Darvas (1996).
moved in favor of the euro in many instance, yet successive hikes of short term
rates by the ECB were often associated with euro weakness rather than strengthen-
ing it. In addition, the dollar gained against the euro even if euro area current
account moved into strong surplus while U.S. current account deficit has grown!
There was a need to look for alternative explanations emphasizing the impact of
portfolio and FDI investments, for example. Up until July of 2001, the portfolio
flows from the euro area to the U.S. stocks reflected differences in expected differ-
ences in productivity growth, they have tracked movements in the euro/U.S. dollar
rate closely. At the same time, the yen versus dollar exchange rate movements
remained more closely tied to the conventional variables as the current account
and interest rate differentials. The paper concluded that different forces deter-
mined these two key exchange rates of international financial markets and that the
currency traders must have looked at different aspects too. This makes one wonder
about the applicability of some safe and proven laws on foreign-currency denomi-
nated asset building. 
We are not speaking of the short term driving forces that rule on these enor-
mous markets which move moneys to the tune of a trillion dollars a day! That
motive is obvious, short-term profit making. Make no mistake. It is clear that the
foreign exchange market is no different from any other financial market in its sus-
ceptibility to profitable forecasting determined by laws. Instead, we mean a reli-
able set of rules that can determine longer-term expectations. Very likely, there is
no such fixed set, which is not subject to change. In light of these uncertainties, lit-
tle wonder that The IMF working paper itself closed with a careful statement:
“To day the high reliance of the U.S. on capital inflows to finance the current
account balance has not been a problem, but if expectations of relative rates of
return on assets, particularly in the euro area were to increase, Competition for
global funds could make markets sensitive to the large U.S. current account deficit
and lead to substantial and rather abrupt changes in major currency rates.”
(Brooks et al., 2001, p.26)
This warning, rather than an intended prophecy, let alone forecast, has come
true by the end of 2011. It could have been said 10 years after it first appeared in
press. The U.S. dollar depreciated by almost 15 per cent against the euro, and by 10
percent against the Japanese yen. The problem is that even a moderately precise
explanation of why this has happened is by no means straightforward. Based on
the above uncertainties, it becomes very hard indeed to assess (let alone forecast)
the real effects of the big swings in exchange rate movements between the three
key currencies of the world economy. This is a reason for concern.
Now, let us turn to the last American-born global market phenomena, to what
we call real and “designed complexity” to spread risk.
3. FRAGILE SECURITIES MARKETS NEED FOR BETTER REGULATION
With the spread of modern technology to gather, store and generate information
about non tangible but engineered financial products (derivatives) that do not
have a traditional market value, one that can be easily measured against its utility
82 KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2011/4
(weighing its profitability against its risk), there is new world and indeed a new
division of labor being formed that neither Adam Smith or nor his successors could
have foreseen. The market for these derivative products is growing rapidly, both on
futures and options exchanges and in private sales, which tend to be more com-
plex and more lucrative, at least for a while. In this new world, the art (not science)
of valuing shares may be getting harder because of changes in the nature of the
economy, creating even greater scope for bubbles to form. When the bulk of a com-
pany’s assets were physical and its markets were relatively stable, valuation was
more straightforward. Now growing proportions of a firm’s assets-brands, ideas,
human capital-are intangible and often hard to identify, let alone value. They are
also less robust than a physical asset such as a factory.26 This new, partly IT-related,
complex market development has increased the difficulties of assessing risk and
value, especially in a global context.
Still, as long as risk remained concentrated within a country and largely its
banks, its financial regulators should have been able to keep tabs on it. The trouble
with today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may be out of their depth. 
Does a global financial system need a global regulator? Who regulates Citigroup,
the world’s largest and most diverse financial institution? With its operations in
over 100 countries, selling just about every financial product that has ever been
invented, probably every financial regulator in the world feels that Citi is, to some
degree, his problem. America alone has the Federal Reserve, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, the
New York Stock Exchange, 50 state insurance commissioners and many others. Yet
in a sense nobody truly regulates Citi: it is a global firm in a world of national and
sometimes sectoral watchdogs. The same is true of AIG, General Electric Capital,
UBS, Deutsche Bank and many more.
Might that be a good thing? Howard Davies, boss of Britain’s Financial Services
Authority, noted that it has become fashionable to think of regulators as
Shakespeare’s “caterpillars of the commonwealth, creatures who, far from adding
value, get in the way of the market”. Naturally Sir Howard does not share this opin-
ion. All the same, it seems clear that much of the dynamism in global finance dur-
ing the past three decades has been due to fewer regulations on the movement of
capital, particularly across borders, and on what can be done with it. For the most
part, money is now free to flow wherever an opportunity presents itself, and has
generally done so, leaving everybody better off than with heavy regulation.
Leaving capital free to move where it could earn the highest return also showed
up over-costly or misplaced regulation: the money simply went elsewhere. For
instance, because Japan prohibited the use of derivatives, options in Japanese secu-
rities were traded in more accommodating Singapore. As Japan gradually eased
these restrictions, some of the offshore business shifted back to Tokyo. In general,
competition for capital has encouraged countries to improve their regulation to
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investors to put a price on profits that would not be forthcoming for many years, and would be
derived from business models and intangible assets such as brands that had not yet been created.
appeal to mobile capital-although some, such as Malaysia, have resisted this pres-
sure, and continue to impose controls on cross-border capital flows. 
Strikingly, there has been no race to the bottom in regulation. Behind every
great market is good regulation-whether by a government agency or organized by
the market participants. Internationally mobile capital has tended to reward regu-
lation that protects investors and minimizes privileges for market insiders. Broadly
speaking, this has led to a convergence of regulation around common internation-
al standards, but this process is by no means complete, particularly for investment
products sold to personal investors. The day when a global firm can sell the same
simple stock market-index fund anywhere in the world remains a long way off.
America remains reluctant to allow European securities exchanges to ply their
trade via screens in America, even though technically this is now easy to do.
“Outrageously protectionist,” stand for the European regulator. 
Given the political difficulties, the idea of a single global regulator is not on any
serious agenda. That may be just as well: competition among regulators has some
benefits. What is on the agenda, at least of the regulators in countries open to inter-
national capital, is to ensure that good information is available about the state of
global markets and about financial firms’ global operations. The FSA, for example,
is able to regulate only Citigroup’s British activities, but it will have a much better
chance of doing it well if it knows enough about the health of the firm worldwide.
Information is already flowing more freely between different national regulators.
Multinational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for
International Settlements and the Financial Stability Forum all play a useful part in
this, but it is bilateral communication between national regulators that matters
most-and the global financial system is nowhere near as transparent to national reg-
ulators as it should be.
One reason is that no global consensus exists on what exactly should be regu-
lated. For instance, in Britain reinsurers are regulated by the FSA, but in their home
markets Munich Re and Swiss Re, the world’s largest reinsurance companies, are
mostly unregulated. Non-financial firms with big financial operations do not fit
comfortably into the current regulatory framework anywhere. Enron, which has
been plausibly described as an investment bank or hedge fund with an energy busi-
ness on the side, was not regulated in America. In Britain, the firm itself was not
regulated, but its financial subsidiaries were monitored by the FSA. There are big
question marks over who regulates the growing number of firms now transform-
ing themselves into financial behemoths, modeled on GE with its huge GE Capital
operation. Hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions are regulated light-
ly in most countries, and not at all in America. 
A second problem, at least in foreign eyes, is that America has too many differ-
ent regulators. Whereas Britain has merged its numerous financial regulators into
a single authority, and several other countries around the world are moving the
same way, America continues with its plethora of different regulators for different
parts of the financial-services industry. It seems doubtful that any of them has a
good overview of what is happening in America’s financial system as a whole-
though the Fed claims it gets all the information it needs, one way or another.
During the Clinton administration, regulation often took place on the golf course
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between Mr. Greenspan, Arthur Levitt, the chairman of the SEC, and Robert Rubin,
the Treasury secretary. All the same, single foreign regulators would find it easier
to resolve cross-border issues with a single American counterpart.
Some American regulators defend their multiple systems, despite the consider-
able duplication it entails, mainly on the ground that regulatory competition keeps
them keen and lean. Certainly, the superiority of the single, consolidated regulator
has yet to be proved. According to a report published in 2009 by the Centre for the
Study of Financial Innovation, “There is a pervasive mood of discontent in the City
with the FSA: people find it bureaucratic, intrusive and insensitive.” Still, the cur-
rent division of labor among the different American regulators is hard to justify.
Why, for instance, should the SEC oversee trading on stock exchanges and the
CFTC trading on futures exchanges when the regulatory needs of all exchanges are
essentially the same? And why is insurance regulated not federally but at the state
level, mostly by elected insurance commissioners? Nobody really thinks this makes
sense, but the system survives because each regulatory body has its own support-
ers in Congress. In some respects, an inefficient regulatory system suits powerful
financial firms. The Glass–Steagall laws, which kept banks, investment banks and
insurers separate, survived a dozen attempts in Congress to scrap them-until 1998,
when Travellers, an insurer, merged with Citibank, which immediately ended its
expensive lobbying against abolition. They went soon after.
The Dodd–Frank Financial Act has reformed the entire system for the satisfac-
tion of almost all players, true the product is lengthy, it is incorporated into twen-
ty five hundred pages of new legislation. 
So far America’s cumbersome regulatory system does not seem to have retard-
ed the development of its markets, but in the long run it may prove costly, partic-
ularly if – and it is a big if – the European Union succeeds in fully integrating its
capital markets and introducing appropriate regulation. America has long boasted
of having the most efficient capital markets in the world, and to date that has
broadly been true. But its unwieldy system of multiple regulators could become a
competitive disadvantage should Europe develop a better, less costly regulatory
mousetrap. Indeed, it is possible that pressure from the EU will help to consoli-
date American regulation. Under a forthcoming EU directive, any financial con-
glomerate operating within the Union will have to choose a main EU regulator
who will be responsible for global supervision of the firm. In practice, the
European regulator for the big American firms, such as Goldman and Citi, will
probably delegate by requiring the firm to nominate one of the American regula-
tors as its “coordinating regulator”, which would become a de facto single nation-
al regulator for the firm. 
Even if the infrastructure for effective global regulation were in place, huge
challenges would remain. Some are of an intellectual sort. “How much failure
should a regulatory system allow?” asked Sir Howard Davies. He did not supply an
answer, beyond saying it should be more than zero, and less than would cause sys-
tem-wide collapse. Another regulator reckons that the ideal would be “a trickle of
little problems, to keep people aware of the risks”. It may be a tribute to American
regulation that Enron was actually allowed to go bust, and luckily this does not
appear to have had system-wide consequences. Some countries might have tried to
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organize a rescue; indeed, even the Fed has a reputation for keeping alive firms that
should have been allowed to die. Understanding whether the level of risk is getting
too high has become harder now that so much risk is being transferred out of the
banking system. Many worry that regulators and financial firms alike are better at
judging the relative riskiness of different instruments, institutions and counterpar-
ties than the total risk in the system. 
The problem has been brought to the fore by the technology bubble, and the
fear of a wider American equity bubble. Do regulators know when a bubble has
formed and the financial system is becoming dangerously imbalanced? Probably
not with enough certainty to base policy on. What is clearer is that aggregate risk
ebbs and flows with the economic cycle, credit officers tend to lend too much in
good times, heating up the economy, and then cut back too much in a downturn,
making things worse. One way to get round this would be to require banks to set
aside higher amounts of capital during economic booms than during recessions, to
make risk-taking less pro-cyclical. How much capital financial firms should set
aside against risks going wrong is the trickiest decision international regulators
have to make. Since 1988, big banks have been abiding by the Basel capital regime,
which links the amount of capital they have to hold in reserve to the riskiness of
the loans they make. However, the categories of risk are too undifferentiated: banks
have to set aside as much capital against a loan to Microsoft as to a Hungarian dot-
com, as much against a loan to America as one to South Korea. Banks have also dis-
covered ways to use derivatives and other securities to allow relatively risky loans
to qualify for a low-risk, low-capital treatment. Regulators fear that a large part of
the growth in the use of derivatives and securitization by banks may stem from eva-
sion of regulatory controls. 
Basel 3, a more sophisticated version of risk-based capital rules, is now in the
pipeline. It is meant to apply not only to big banks but to all banks worldwide, and
to all investment firms in the EU. There is also talk of an insurance Basel before
long. But Basel 3 has met with considerable opposition, partly because it is too
complicated, partly because some countries disagree over how much capital
should be set aside against some sorts of loans. Germany wants a lower capital
requirement for loans to small businesses, for example, because bank loans are
their traditional source of funding. The launch of the new regime, originally sched-
uled for 2004, had already been delayed. Meanwhile, the banks are operating with
a capital regime that does not work as intended, but may be lulling regulators into
a false sense of security.
In determining regulatory capital, Basel 3 would give an even more important
role to credit-rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. How good
their ratings are is the subject of much debate. As an alternative, banks will be
encouraged to use their own in-house credit ratings. But regulators still mistrust
the use of quantitative credit-risk models to set regulatory capital. They need bet-
ter techniques and better data, especially in Europe. Many big banks already use
quantitative models to assess how much capital they need to set aside against port-
folios of marketable securities. These “value at risk” (VAR) models typically mea-
sure the most the firm could lose in a day, judging by past performance, but they
tend to underestimate the frequency with which really bad days occur. There have
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been half a dozen “perfect storms” in the market in the past decade, during which
VAR calculations proved useless in predicting losses. Stress-testing portfolios
against imaginary perfect storms remedies some of the weaknesses. But modeling
credit risk in this way is much harder, not least because data about past credit per-
formance are scarce.
Another market-based system of regulation has also received some attention. If
banks issue short-term subordinated debt that is traded every day and has to be
refinanced regularly, and can stay in business only as long as the debt is refinanced,
then the market will in effect regulate the bank. Lenders will not finance a bank
they think is in risk of default. Alas, the only country to have tried it so far has been
Argentina, where the government’s fleecing of the banking system after its debt
default rather spoilt the plot. Regulators are only too aware that the sheer complex-
ity of the financial system imposes practical limitations on what they can do.
Increasingly, they are having to rely on the private sector to assist them in their reg-
ulatory task. They simply do not have the capacity to find out what risks are being
taken inside a large international bank unless it tells them. 
The consolidation in the banking sector may be increasing the risk of the
financial system in other ways.27 The new global dilemma, and with it the real
danger, that the risk originally taken on by the capital markets will eventually
find its way back into the banking system. Much of the risk-transfer apparently
being undertaken may be an accounting ruse, designed to escape regulatory
capital requirements without truly shedding the risk. And if insurers are unable
to meet their liabilities and go bankrupt, the banks may be caught short of need-
ed reserve funds. It is safe to assume that much of the unwanted risk assumed by
the banking sector may end up in the hands of less sophisticated investors,
including some of the individuals now being targeted by the financial-services
firms. They may be taking on this risk unwittingly. Nobody knows how those
individuals might react if they found out, or how this would affect the economy
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27 Consolidation has cut down the number of big market participants. In 1995, 20 banks in the United
States accounted for 75% of foreign exchange transactions; by 2001, the number was down to 13.
What is certain is that financial firms, especially on Wall Street and in the City of London, love deriv-
atives, and have hired an army of mathematicians and physicists to work as "financial engineers", cre-
ating complex new derivatives to shift risk around the financial system. Credit derivatives already
have a nominal value of almost $1 trillion, up from around $100 billion five years ago. They are fore-
cast to top $3 trillion by 2005. The nominal value of over-the-counter derivatives now exceeds $100
trillion, 60% of which is handled by a mere five dealers, including two giants, J.P. Morgan and
Citigroup. Derivatives and other tools of financial engineering can be used to manage risk better by
hedging positions and transferring unwanted risk to a counter-party, which is what banks say they
mostly use them for. However, those tools can also be used to increase risk, perhaps by a big margin,
and there is a growing danger that this will be done accidentally. Leaving capital free to move where
it could earn the highest return also showed up over-costly or misplaced regulation: the money sim-
ply went elsewhere. For instance, because Japan prohibited the use of derivatives, options in
Japanese securities were traded in more accommodating Singapore. As Japan gradually eased these
restrictions, some of the offshore business shifted back to Tokyo. In general, competition for capital
has encouraged countries to improve their regulation to appeal to mobile capital-although some,
such as Malaysia, have resisted this pressure, and continue to impose controls on cross-border capi-
tal flows. 
as a whole. They might feel poorer and less inclined to spend, which could
inflict the sort of damage on the economy and the banking system fears. There
is a real threat that it might accelerate itself through the reverse multiplier. Still,
as long as risk remained concentrated within a country and largely its banks, its
financial regulators should have been able to keep tabs on it. The trouble with
today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may be out of their depth, their
national jurisdiction. In this sense, there is an obvious need for global regulation.
At the same time, it seems clear that much of the dynamism in global finance
during the past three decades has been due to fewer regulations on the move-
ment of capital, particularly across borders, and on what can be done with it. For
the most part, money is now free to flow wherever an opportunity presents
itself, and has generally done so, leaving everybody better off than with heavy
regulation. One should add, in the general case with normal behavior.28
Given the serious political difficulties, the idea of a single global regulator is
not on any serious agenda. That may be just as well: competition among regula-
tors has some benefits. What is on the agenda, at least of the regulators in coun-
tries open to international capital, is to ensure that good information is available
about the state of global markets and about financial firms’ global operations.
The FSA, for example, is able to regulate only Citigroup’s British activities, but it
will have a much better chance of doing it well if it knows enough about the
health of the firm worldwide. Information is already flowing more freely
between different national regulators. Multinational institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and the
Financial Stability Forum all play a useful part in this, but it is bilateral commu-
nication between national regulators that matters most, and the global financial
system is nowhere near as transparent to national regulators as it should be
(Magas, 2000, 2009).
Understanding whether the level of risk is getting too high has become hard-
er now that so much risk is being transferred out of the banking system. The
problem has been brought to the fore by the technology bubble, and the fear of
a wider American equity bubble. Do regulators know when a bubble has formed
and the financial system is becoming dangerously unbalanced? Probably not,
with enough certainty to base policy on. What is clearer is that aggregate risk
changes and flows with the economic cycle. Credit officers tend to lend too
much in good times, heating up the economy, and then cut back too much in a
downturn, making things worse. One way to get around this would be to require
banks to set aside higher amounts of capital during economic booms than dur-
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28 In this context, mention must be made of how a natural scientist views the world of modern finan-
cial markets, and ask the question more often heard: “Why do so many people cling so hard to the
notion of efficient markets?” Emanuel Derman of Goldman Sachs, one of the growing number of for-
mer physicists working in investment banking, puts this notion in perspective. In finance, he says,
you are playing against people, who value assets on the basis of their feelings about the future.
“These feelings are ephemeral, or at best unstable.” What a simple way to portray the complex reali-
ty (as quoted by U.S. Weekly Analyst, Goldman Sachs, March 24 2002).
ing recessions, to make risk-taking less pro-cyclical.29 If this was internationally
required, it would be all the better. Initiatives in this regard should come from
the regulators of the largest key players of the American markets.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
(a) The two prime transmitters of competitive forces in the global economy are the
multinational corporations and the international capital markets. They both
show revealed systemic behavior with well defined goals and measurable effi-
ciency. For good global market performance, however, – among other things –
we need efficient markets (with respect to information processing), good
rules, and, of course, determined, yet not over-ambitious regulators that have a
powerful bite. In a global economic framework, however, as of yet, we do not
seem to have any of these requirements met. National government choices, as
well as multinational company and individual international investment deci-
sions do remain largely within their “own” perceived boundaries, and without
regard to any “globally defined” or desired goals. This present dichotomy of
determining international economic events by large-country (e.g. USA, EU-27,
Japan) preferences, but in fact domestic macro needs, and by firm-level multi-
national company preferences, is not likely to change soon. At the same time,
there is increasing need to act and manage markets globally, and, as conse-
quence there is a need to be ready to coordinate national policy actions, regu-
late multinational company behavior and agree on some commonly shared
safety rules of international financial markets. These global coordination
efforts can be looked at as contributions to the provision of global economic
stability, which is a valuable public good. 
(b) As a general rule, competing firms, domestic and international alike, do learn
from their past mistakes and constantly adapt to change. We have reasoned
that governments and regulators learn, too. True, they learn slowly, but they do
learn. In this perspective, there is an evolution of concepts and proper policy
actions as a function of a constantly changing global economic environment.
Although the macro economy is not self-correcting, it has a learning capacity.
At least, that is the impression one gets from the American experience of inter-
actions between markets and government of the last two decades. In the
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29 How much capital financial firms should set aside against risks going wrong is the trickiest decision
international regulators have to make. Since 1988, big banks have been abiding by the Basel capital
regime, which links the amount of capital they have to hold in reserve to the overall risk of the loans
they make. Basel-3, a more sophisticated version of risk-based capital rules, is now under way. It is
meant to apply not only to big banks but to all banks worldwide, and to all investment firms in the
EU. There is also talk of an insurance Basel before long. But Basel 3 has met with considerable oppo-
sition, partly because it is too complicated, partly because some countries disagree over how much
capital should be set aside against some sorts of loans. Germany wants a lower capital requirement
for loans to small businesses, for example, because bank loans are their traditional source of fund-
ing.
American economy, overall, we argued that despite the recent dramatic weak-
ness of the stock market, and despite the corporate scandals, the resilience of
its financial system and the attractiveness of its domestic markets in the eye of
foreign investors has not diminished dramatically. This surprising loyalty can
be accredited in no small measure to the mostly proper economic policy mea-
sures taken, or, – if you like – to the trusted values of the American market
mechanisms in general.
(c) Based on the international debt history of the U.S. economy, we suggested that
for a more even and sustainable future growth-pattern for the world economy,
a higher U.S. savings rate and a higher Japanese and euro-area consumption
rate would be beneficial. This by no means is a novelty, but it can be consid-
ered as a very pressing global issue to be (re)addressed soon.
(d) Neither the IT revolution nor globalization have managed to delete, let alone
iron out unwanted recessionary business cycles. In addition, we argued that
Central banks should constantly monitor the wealth effects too, not just infla-
tion. This has been a recent lesson to be (re) learned. Thus, we stressed that the
useful elements of anti-cyclical government interference should be kept. What
is more, ongoing intergovernmental efforts are needed to sustain global
demand.
(e) Recent capital market developments have confirmed that there is also a need to
overseeing the global impacts of international capital movements. The need
for some globally coordinated supervision of international capital mobility is
warranted if it is to match the accelerated intra-company cross border flows of
funds with some regulation, to prevent the hiding of unwanted risk interna-
tionally. The trouble with today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may
be out of their “depth”, i.e. jurisdiction. In this sense, there is an obvious need
for some kind of global regulation that increases global safety standards of
managing risks that are being spread over numerous international partici-
pants. Unlike domestic capital markets, global markets have no desire and
means to self-police, not to mention a strong formal supervision.
(f) But certain things do not change, as it was put by former FED chairman Alan
Greenspan(2003) in one of his famous statements: “…there is no tool to change
human nature. Too often people are prone to  recurring bouts of optimism and
pessimism that manifest themselves from  time to time in the build-up or ces-
sation of speculative excesses.”
When exactly the build up collapses is very hard to tell and forecast, so the Rajan
(2010) statement sounds as a realistic tune: “The credit crisis was certainly not one
of those ‘forecastable’ events. If we ask why economists failed to predict the credit
crisis, we should also ask why political scientists failed to predict the recent Arab
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